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CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN THE SECOND

CIRCUIT AFTER BOOKER: THEORETICAL
AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
KEVIN J. DOYLE*

From 1987 to 2005, federal judges sentenced criminal
defendants under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("U.S.S.G."), a highly structured system designed in part to
promote "uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for
similar criminal conduct by similar offenders."' On January 12,
2005, however, the United States Supreme Court declared the
federal sentencing system unconstitutional in United States v.
Booker.2 Applying its decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey3 and
Blakely v. Washington,4 the Court held that the Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they
authorized the imposition of an enhanced sentence "based on the
sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior

*Currently practices at Marino Tortorella PC, a boutique white collar criminal defense
and complex civil litigation firm. The author was a law clerk for the Honorable Peter W.
Hall, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. J.D during the 2005-2006
judical term, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 1996, Georgetown University.
1 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.1, historical note, ch. 1, pt. A, n.3
(2003). See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 11-13 (1998) (commenting on the mandatory sentencing regime
created by the Guidelines, Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes note that "the federal
Sentencing Guidelines... [sought] to replace the discretionary power of judges with an
elaborate, less intuitive, and more scientific system for the elaboration of penal
sanctions").
2 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For a representative discussion of why the remedy proposed in
Booker has not rectified the failings of the mandatory Guidelines sentencing regime, see
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A StructuralAnalysis,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1349-50 (2005).
3 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant."5
However, as is often the case with landmark Supreme Court
precedent, the Justices left to the lower federal courts the
practical implementation of its Booker mandate. 6 Consequently,
defendants and their counsel, the district courts, as well as
prosecutors in the United States Attorneys' Offices have looked
to the federal courts of appeals for guidance on the myriad of
issues that have arisen in the wake of Booker's apparent
dismantling of the federal system of sentencing. This Article is
intended to provide a precis of sentencing law under the postBooker regime in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ("Second Circuit"). Although the focus primarily
is on the Second Circuit's practical implementation of the
Supreme Court's mandate thus far, this necessarily requires
examination of the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, culminating in Booker.
Part I provides a brief overview of the Booker decision,
examining the constitutional issues resolved and the remedy
proposed. Part II examines the Second Circuit's implementation
of Booker in its seminal Crosby decision. This includes current
sentencing procedure in the district courts of the Second Circuit;
appellate review of those sentences under a "reasonableness"
standard; and disposition of those pre-Booker sentences that
remain on direct review. Part III considers the Second Circuit's
resolution of several discrete issues that have arisen after
Booker: whether a presumption of reasonableness should apply to
5 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. In this respect the substantive holding in Booker was
unremarkable. In 2004, the Supreme Court found Washington State's determinate
sentencing scheme unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because it permitted
enhancement of a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory range based on "aggravating
facts" found by the judge. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. Booker simply applied the Blakely
holding to the similar constitutional infirmities of the Sentencing Guidelines. As
discussed in Part I.B. infra, it is not the Court's resolution of the Sixth Amendment
challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines, but rather its proposed remedy, that has caused
the divergence in the circuits' approaches to post-Booker sentencing issues. For a
comprehensive historical treatment of the Sixth Amendment and criminal sentencing, see
Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 693, 693-719 (2005).
6 See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 HOuS. L. REV. 341, 355 (2006) (observing that while "answering the most basic
questions about the Guidelines' status as a result of its Blakely ruling, the Supreme Court
in Booker ultimately raised more questions than it answered concerning the day-to-day
particulars of operating an advisory sentencing guideline system").
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sentences within the Guidelines range; whether retroactive
application of Booker to cases on direct appellate review violates
ex post facto principles; whether Booker should apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review; whether after Booker a
defendant's sentence may be based on facts not alleged in the
indictment; and whether sentence disparities between codefendants in the same case may serve as a basis for a nonGuidelines sentence.
Part III concludes with a consideration
of several
miscellaneous subjects related to the issue of substantive
sentencing law and procedure: whether after Booker the burden
remains on the defendant to prove eligibility for safety-valve
relief; whether a restitution order imposed as part of a
defendant's sentence violates the Sixth Amendment because it is
often based on facts not reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant; and whether Booker's protections apply when a
district judge imposes additional imprisonment for a defendant's
violation of conditions of release.
Where appropriate, the
approach of the Second Circuit on these issues is contrasted with
that of the other circuits. Part IV provides a brief and general
assessment of the Booker decision and the Second Circuit's
implementing jurisprudence. Given the relatively brief life of the
new advisory sentencing system, these observations must
necessarily be tentative. The circuit courts are still in the
process of working through the issues that have arisen with the
implementation of Booker's mandate. Nevertheless, scholars and
other commentators have begun examining the broader legal and
policy issues arising from Booker, providing us with important
insights on sentencing procedure going forward. 7
The primary aim of this Article, however, is to provide
practical guidance on how the Second Circuit is applying the
Booker precedent. While the legal and theoretical implications of
this evolving jurisprudence are given due consideration, it is
simply too soon to make any definitive judgments on the new
sentencing paradigm.
7 See id. at 356 (highlighting "how the 'Booker fixes' (i.e., the major changes to the
federal sentencing system that have been proposed in the wake of Booker) necessarily
present significant legal, policy, and practical problems"); see also Bowman, supra note 2,
at 1317 (examining the Court's constitutional ruling in Booker in light of the "broader
ongoing debate about the state of sentencing in America").
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I. THE BOOKER/FANFAN OPINION
A federal jury sitting in the Western District of Wisconsin
found Freddie Booker guilty of possession with intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine based on violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 8 The Sentencing Guidelines provided for a
sentence of "not less than 210 nor more than 262 months in
prison."9 After taking evidence at Booker's sentencing hearing,
the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Booker had in fact possessed additional quantities of cocaine and
obstructed justice.lO These findings mandated that the judge
impose a sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment."1
Booker received a 30-year sentence. 12 The jury did not find, nor
did Booker admit, the facts supporting the sentence
enhancement.13 The Seventh Circuit held that the resulting
sentence violated Booker's Sixth Amendment rights and
remanded to the district court.14 Upon remand, the district court
could either sentence Booker to the range of penalties supported
by the facts as found by the jury at trial or convene a separate
sentencing hearing at which facts supporting the enhancement
could be found by a jury, thereby satisfying the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment as articulated in Apprendi and Blakely. 15
In Fanfan's case, a jury in the District of Maine convicted him
of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
at least 500 grams of cocaine. 16 The jury's verdict authorized a
maximum sentence of 78 months.1 7 At a subsequent sentencing
hearing, the district court found additional facts that would have
increased Fanfan's sentencing range to 188-235 months.' 8 The
district judge, however, read Blakely to preclude his application
of these facts to support the enhancements provided for in the
8 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
9 Id.

10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. (noting that the jury only heard evidence as to Booker's possession of 92.5
grams of cocaine; the judge found the facts to be true at a later post-trial sentencing
proceeding).
14 Id. at 227-28.
15 Id. at 228.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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Guidelines. 19 Fanfan received a 78-month term of imprisonment,
the sentence authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. 20
The Supreme Court granted the petitions for writs of certiorari
filed in both cases in order to determine if the Sixth Amendment
is violated "by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing
judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction)
that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant." 2 1 If
the Court answered this substantive constitutional question in
the affirmative, it would then have to consider whether it was
appropriate to declare the Guidelines inapplicable entirely in
cases where the Guidelines require the court to find a sentence22
enhancing fact.
A. The Substantive Opinion
While the substance of the Court's Sixth Amendment holding
is not doctrinally unprecedented, it is nevertheless a strong
reaffirmation of the "deeply embedded" right to a jury trial that
is fundamental to our system of criminal justice. 2 3 It is an axiom
of the common law, as well as our Constitution, that a criminal
defendant may only be convicted "'upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."' 24 In determinate sentencing
systems, 2 5 however, a sentencing judge is authorized to make
19 Id. at 228-29.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 229 n.1.
22 Id. at 229 n.2. The Booker decision resulted, rather unusually, in dual majority
opinions. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg,
authored the substantive opinion announcing the Sixth Amendment holding in the case.
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Ginsburg, wrote the "second" majority opinion announcing the remedial holding, i.e.,
rendering the Guidelines "advisory," as explained in Part I.B, infra.
23 Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961) (stating that even though Fourteenth
Amendment does not require use of jury trials in State criminal procedure, "every State
has constitutionally provided trial by jury").
24 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
25 A "determinate" sentencing system is one that prescribes a precise range of
penalties that attaches to the criminal conduct for which a defendant is convicted. In such
systems, judges are divested of a significant amount of discretion in determining the
appropriate sentence in a particular case. For a description of such a system, see United
States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2005), explaining that "[i]n a determinate
sentencing regime, a jury finds facts that support a conviction. That conviction, in turn,
authorizes the imposition of a sentence within a specified range, established either by
statute or administrative guideline, which we call a determinate sentence." Id.
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post-conviction findings of fact, which then may be used to
impose an enhanced sentence.
For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey26 the applicable state
statute provided that conviction of possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose was punishable by imprisonment for "between
five years and 10 years." 27 Under New Jersey's separate "hate
crime" statute, 2 8 however, the ten-year statutory maximum
sentence could be increased to anywhere "between 10 and 20
years."2 9 Reviewing the adequacy of New Jersey's sentencing
procedure under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court concluded that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."30 Significantly,
the Court drew no distinction for purposes of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments between an "element" of an offense and
a "sentencing factor." 3 1 In other words, a criminal defendant is
entitled to have the jury determine not only if the prosecution
has established all the elements of the underlying substantive
offense, but also any other facts that may in the end serve to
increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum for that
offense. Apprendi therefore effectively treated facts that enhance
the sentence beyond the statutory maximum as additional
elements of the crime that must be proved to the jury. 32
26 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 2004) ("In the case of a crime of the second
degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between
five years and 10 years.").
28 New Jersey's "hate crime" statute provided for an enhanced sentence if the
sentencing judge found that "the defendant committing the crime acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 2004).
30 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
31 Id. at 478.
32 As the Court would later describe this portion of its Apprendi holding:
The fact that New Jersey labeled the hate crime a 'sentence enhancement' rather
than a separate criminal act was irrelevant for constitutional purposes. As a matter
of simple justice, it seemed obvious that the procedural safeguards designed to
protect Apprendi from punishment for the possession of a firearm should apply
equally to his violation of the hate crime statute. Merely using the label 'sentence
enhancement' to describe the latter did not provide a principled basis for treating the
two crimes differently.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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Similarly, in Ring v. Arizona3 3 the Court held that a trial judge
may not herself determine if the necessary aggravating factors
3
are present under Arizona law to impose the death penalty. 4
The Ring Court reiterated that the label a state places on this
type of fact-finding is not dispositive of the constitutional
inquiry. 35 The fact remains that the resulting increased
punishment is constitutionally illegitimate unless the jury has
found the facts in support thereof. Thus, Apprendi and Ring
represent the Supreme Court's attempt to "preserv[e] an ancient
guarantee under a new set of circumstances." 36 The unassailable
common law right to a jury trial on allegations of criminality, the
Court has explained, must be preserved in a system that places
"increasing emphasis on facts that enhance[] sentencing
ranges."3 7 Because sentence enhancements "increase[d] the
judge's power and diminish[ed] that of the jury.., the jury's
finding of the underlying crime became less significant [a]nd the
enhancements became very serious indeed." 3 8 The Court's
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to apply with equal force
in the sentence enhancement context thus ensured "that the jury
would still stand between the individual and the power of the
government under the new sentencing regime." 3 9
Finally, in Blakely v. Washington40 the Court applied Apprendi
to prohibit a trial judge from enhancing a sentence beyond the
state's prescribed Guidelines range (not the statutory maximum)
based on facts not found by the jury. 4 1 Thus, Blakely was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when the judge found
facts supporting an enhancement beyond the state Guidelines
range, but not ultimately in excess of the statutory maximum for
33 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
34 Id. at 588-89. The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment does not allow
defendants to receive penalties that exceed the minimum they would receive if they were
punished ". . . according to facts present in the jury verdict alone." Id. This reasoning
governs even if State characterizes additional findings made by judge as "sentencing
factors." Id.
35 Id. at 602 ('Merely using the label 'sentence enhancement' to describe the [second
act] surely does not provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] differently."
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476).
36 Booker, 543 U.S. at 237.
37 Id. at 236.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 237.
40 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
41 See id. at 301.
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the offense. 42 Given the similarity between Washington State's
sentencing regime and the federal Sentencing Guidelines, 43 it
appeared to some federal district judges in advance of the Booker
decision that the Guidelines were no longer constitutionally
valid. 4 4 Indeed, several circuit courts explicitly held as much. 45
In finding "no distinction of constitutional significance between
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the [Blakely sentencing
procedures],"46 the Booker Court focused its analysis on the
mandatory nature of the federal Guidelines. 47 Upon
consideration of the prescribed offense level associated with the
criminal conduct and the defendant's criminal history category, a
district judge was required to impose the sentence specified in
the Guidelines.4 8 In Booker's case, the district judge found facts
related to the quantity of drugs in Booker's possession, which in
turn enhanced his mandatory sentence an additional 10 years. 49
Because the Court's precedent was clear by the time of Booker
that the Sixth Amendment required facts of such consequence to
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines failed to pass constitutional muster.50

42 Id. at 313-14.

43 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 231-32 (noting that both plans permitted judges to increase
sentences upon a unilateral finding of aggravating facts).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D. Mass. 2004)
(determining that Blakely applied to the federal Sentencing Guidelines and "that the
Guidelines [were] rendered unconstitutional in their entirety by that application"); United
States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238 (D. Utah 2004) (postulating that "the
inescapable conclusion of Blakely is that the federal sentencing guidelines have been
rendered unconstitutional in cases such as this one").
45 For a more thorough accounting of the jurisprudential path from Apprendi to
Blakely to Booker, see Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing
Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2005).
46 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
47 Indeed, the Court noted that "the constitutional issues presented by these cases
would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [Sentencing Reform
Act] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges." Id. at 233. While
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) listed the "established sentencing range" as one of several factors a
district judge should consider, subsection (b) then required the imposition of a Guidelines
sentence. Id. at 233-34.
48 See id. at 235 (describing the Guidelines sentencing process on the facts of Booker's
case).
49 Id.

50 Id. at 243-44 (noting fairness and reliability have always outweighed expediency
in criminal trials).
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B. The Remedial Opinion
The Supreme Court responded by rendering the Guidelines
"effectively advisory." 5 1 The Court accomplished this by excising
from the Sentencing Reform Act two provisions that made the
Guidelines mandatory in application. 5 2 The first provision, 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), "require[d] sentencing courts to impose a
sentence within the applicable Guidelines range," and the
second, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), "set forth standards of review on
appeal, including de novo review of departures from the
applicable Guidelines range." 53 The Court emphasized that "[t]he
system remaining after excision, while lacking the mandatory
features that Congress enacted, retains other features that help
to further these objectives." 5 4 Thus, although the Guidelines were
no longer mandatory, district courts were nevertheless instructed
to "consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing."55 Upon determining a Guidelines sentence, however,
district courts were to consider the seven factors set out in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) in arriving at the ultimate sentence
determination. 56 Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell has
succinctly described the resulting post-Booker sentencing
landscape:
[I]t is permissible to enhance a sentence on the basis of
judge-found facts so long as the district judge has discretion
to impose a sentence either higher or lower than the
Guidelines range, on the basis of broad statutory factors.
Under this new system, sentences continue to be subject to
be
appellate review, but variances from the Guidelines will
57
reversed only if the resulting sentence is 'unreasonable.'
Judge McConnell posits that the Booker opinion is susceptible
of two interpretations. 58 Under a reading which he terms "Booker
maximalism," district judges "are liberated to sentence criminal
51 Id. at 245 (suggesting that although the Guidelines sentencing ranges are no
longer mandatory, district judges should nevertheless consider them at sentencing).
52 Id. at 245-46.
53 Id. at 259.
54 Id. at 264.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 261.
57 Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 666 (2006).
58 Id.
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defendants in accordance with the judge's sense of individualized
justice, with the Guidelines merely taken into 'consideration' for
what they are worth." 59 This would appear to be at odds with the
Booker Court's expressed intent to "maintain[] a strong
connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real
conduct - a connection important to the increased uniformity of
sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to
achieve." 60 The other interpretation - "Booker minimalism" holds that Booker has effected only a "modest adjustment" to
sentencing procedure because the Guidelines range still enjoys a
presumption of reasonableness and the district judge bears the
onus of justifying his imposition of a sentence outside of that
range. 6 1
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF BOOKER
A. Sentencing in the District Courts After Booker
With the issuance of its opinion in United States v. Crosby,62
the Second Circuit became the first federal appeals court to
delineate the effect of Booker on federal sentencing procedure.63
Booker, the court observed, "can be expected to have a significant
effect on sentencing in federal criminal cases, although perhaps
not as drastic an effect as some might suppose." 64 Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Jon 0. Newman emphasized that:
59 Id.
60 Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
61 See McConnell, supra note 57, at 666-67. Some commentators, particularly those
in the defense bar, have criticized any so-called "presumption of reasonableness" as
undercutting Booker's intention to remove the "mandatoriness" of the Guidelines regime.
For one such example, see Posting of Yuanchung Lee to Second Circuit Blog, Crosby
Redux:
Circuit
Clarifies
Some
Important
Post-Booker
Issues,
http://circuit2.blogspot.com/2006/04/crosby-redux-circuit-clarifies-some.html (Apr. 4, 2006)
in which the author criticizes as inconsistent the Second Circuit's refusal on the one hand
to establish a presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable with its observation
that as a general matter a Guidelines sentence will fall within the broad range of
sentences that would be deemed reasonable upon appellate review. Id. Incidentally, the
courts of appeals do not uniformly agree on whether a Guidelines sentence should be
considered presumptively reasonable, an issue that is addressed more thoroughly in Part
III.A., infra.
62 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
63 Id. at 106.
64 Id. at 110-11. Although the Booker decision excised that portion of the statute
making the Guidelines mandatory in application, sentencing judges are still required to
consider the various factors of the guidelines. Id. at 111.
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the excision of the mandatory aspect of the Guidelines does
not mean that the Guidelines have been discarded. On the
contrary, sentencing judges remain under a duty with
respect to the Guidelines - not the previously imposed
duty to apply the Guidelines, but the continuing duty to
'consider' them, along with the other factors listed in
65
section 3553(a).
The court then proceeded to lay out the mechanics of the
sentencing process after Booker. First, in "considering" the
Guidelines, district judges are required to calculate the
Guidelines range as they did pre-Booker.66 This includes finding
those facts that may enhance the sentence beyond the range that
would result based only on facts admitted by the defendant or
found by the jury. 6 7 Because application of the Guidelines is no
longer mandatory after Booker, such judicial fact-finding would
no longer run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. 6 8 Importantly, "the
sentencing judge [is] entitled to find all of the facts that the
Guidelines make relevant to the determination of a Guidelines
sentence and all of the facts relevant to determination of a non69
Guidelines sentence."
Next, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), district judges are dutybound to "consider" the resulting Guidelines range. 70 But under a
regime in which the Guidelines are only advisory, what precisely
must a district judge do to satisfy his obligation to "consider" the
Guidelines range? The Second Circuit declined in Crosby,7 1 and
65 Id. at 111. Among the factors outlined in § 3553(a) are: the nature and
circumstances of the offense; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness
of the offense as well as provide just punishment and deterrence; the kinds of sentences
and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant; pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
similarly situated defendants; and the need to provide restitution to victims of the
criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
66 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112. The Booker decision still required sentencing judges to
determine the applicable Guidelines range for the defendant. See id.
67 See id. A sentencing judge can only find facts relevant to the determination of a
Guidelines sentence. Id.
68 See id. The Supreme Court found that the advisory Guidelines would allow the
sentencing judge to find relevant facts for a Guidelines sentence without violating a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 113.
71 See id. The court stated "We need not on this appeal endeavor to determine what
degree of consideration is required," and "[wie will not prescribe any formulation a
sentencing judge will be obliged to follow in order to demonstrate discharge of the duty to
'consider' the Guidelines." Id. Therefore, the court disposed of the case without mandating
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has declined in subsequent cases, to engage in a semantic
discussion of the precise meaning of the term. 7 2 The court
requires no "robotic incantations" by district judges to ensure
that they have actually "considered" the § 3553(a) factors. 7 3 The
what a sentencing judge must "consider." Id.
72 In United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005), a companion case to
Crosby, the Second Circuit elaborated on the district court's duty to "consider" the §
3553(a) factors:
We appreciate that lexicographers, contemplating various contexts in which the
word 'consider' is used, might infuse the word with a meaning that implies a
measure of sustained reflection. But our context is that of experienced district
judges, familiar with both the substantive content of relevant law and procedural
requirements, who face the daunting task of administering heavy caseloads. In this
context, we continue to believe that no specific verbal formulations should be
prescribed to demonstrate the adequate discharge of the duty to 'consider' matters
relevant to sentencing. As long as the judge is aware of both the statutory
requirements and the sentencing range or ranges that are arguably applicable, and
nothing in the record indicates misunderstanding about such materials or
misperception about their relevance, we will accept that the requisite consideration
has occurred.
Id. at 100.
73 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113. Albeit in a case of somewhat unusual procedural and
factual background, the Second Circuit recently vacated and remanded a sentence
because the district court inadequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. See United States
v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006). Having heard two appeals of the sentences
imposed in Toohey's case, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence and reassigned the
case to a different judge for sentencing in accordance with its remand instructions. Id. at
543-44. Briefly, Toohey was convicted of making a willful false statement on his income
tax return. Id. at 543. Although the then-mandatory Guidelines called for a sentencing
range of 15-21 months' imprisonment, the district court downwardly departed and
sentenced Toohey to two years' probation. Id. On the first appeal, the Second Circuit
vacated and remanded, inter alia, on the ground that the district court's departure
decision lacked sufficient explanation under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Id. The district court
imposed the same sentence on remand, which, now applying Booker, the Second Circuit
again vacated for lack of sufficient explanation. Id. The district court was instructed to
"consider all" the § 3553(a) factors in determining if a Guidelines or non-Guidelines
sentence should be imposed. Id. at 544. The district court then imposed a fifteen-month
sentence and stated on the record that the first two sentences reflected the prior
professional relationship the district judge and the defendant enjoyed when the two were
in law practice together. Id. As the Second Circuit read the sentencing transcript, the
district court based its sentencing decision on the appellate court's reasoning in its prior
summary order vacating the previous sentence, its perceived need to "correct" its
admittedly "sympathy-based" sentencing decision, and its desire not to "abuse the
Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 545. These reasons, the Second Circuit held, "do not reflect
an adequate consideration, either implicitly or explicitly, of the factors listed in § 3553(a)."
Id. The appellate court was particularly concerned that the district court imposed a prison
term ostensibly because it interpreted previous remand orders from the circuit court
essentially as prison term mandates. Id. Citing Crosby, the Second Circuit deemed the
district court's sentence "unreasonable for legal error in the method of its selection." Id. at
546. Therefore, in the Toohey case the court gave an early indication of what "inadequate
consideration" of the statutory factors looks like. Consistent with Crosby, however, the
Toohey case maintains the Circuit's open-ended conception of the term "consider," finding
only that the district court's minimalist approach to justifying Toohey's sentence was
legally insufficient. Nevertheless, the burden on the district court at sentencing does not
appear onerous; the court must simply apply the statutory factors to the particular
factual circumstances of a defendant's case.
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court has taken rather a common law approach to the issue,
permitting the concept "to evolve as district judges faithfully
perform their statutory duties."74
After considering the Guidelines range as well as the § 3553(a)
factors, district judges must next decide whether "to impose the
sentence that would have been imposed under the Guidelines...
or to impose a non-Guidelines sentence." 75
B. Appellate Review of Sentences After Booker
After Booker, appellate courts review sentences for
"reasonableness," 76 an inherently pliable standard of review, and
one that inevitably will require judicial interpretation going
forward. 77 It is clear, however, that "reasonableness" is "not
limited to consideration of the length of the sentence." 78
Regardless of length, a sentence is "unreasonable" if legal or
procedural errors led to its imposition. 79 The Second Circuit has
74 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113. Notwithstanding its flexible approach to determining
when a district judge has "considered" the Guidelines, the Second Circuit was emphatic
that after Booker, sentencing judges are in no way authorized to make judgment calls as
to whether the Guidelines even need be consulted in a given case:
[lit is important to bear in mind that Booker/Fanfan and section 3553(a) do more
than render the Guidelines a body of casual advice, to be consulted or overlooked
at the whim of the sentencing judge. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that,
after Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing regime that
existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered discretion to select any sentence
within the applicable statutory maximum and minimum.
Id. Thus, the Second Circuit's approach appears to be at least an implicit endorsement of
what has been described as "Booker minimalism"; namely, that district judges' sentencing
discretion is significantly constrained by the requirement that they calculate a Guidelines
range and apply the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th
Cir. 2005), which notes that a district court cannot "import [its] own philosophy of
sentencing if it is inconsistent" with the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
75 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113.
76 See id. at 114.
77 The Second Circuit indicated that the flexibility of "reasonableness" review is
consonant with the spirit of Booker and thus declined to announce any abstract rules on
"reasonableness":
Because 'reasonableness' is inherently a concept of flexible meaning, generally
lacking precise boundaries, we decline to fashion any per se rules as to the
reasonableness of every sentence within an applicable guideline or the
unreasonableness of every sentence outside an applicable guideline. Indeed,
such per se rules would risk being invalidated as contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Booker/Fanfan, because they would effectively re-institute
mandatory adherence to the Guidelines.
Id. at 115. In the language of then-Chief Judge Walker, "we have declined to adopt per se
rules, opting instead to fashion the mosaic of reasonableness through case-by-case
adjudication." United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2006).
78 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114.
79 See id. at 114-15.
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identified four potential procedural errors that would justify a
finding of "unreasonableness": (1) "making factual findings and
mandatorily enhancing a sentence above the range applicable to
facts found by a jury or admitted by a defendant"; (2)
"mandatorily applying the applicable Guidelines range that was
based solely on facts found by a jury or admitted by a defendant";
(3) failing to "consider" the applicable Guidelines rangeSO as well
as the other § 3553(a) factors; and (4) "limiting consideration of
the applicable Guidelines range to the facts found by the jury or
admitted by the defendant, instead of considering the applicable
Guidelines range.., based on facts found by the court."8 1
In summary, reasonableness review in the Second Circuit is a
two-pronged analytical process: (1) procedural reasonableness,in
which the court will look to see if the district court identified the
appropriate Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory,
and considered the Guidelines alongside the other § 3553(a)
factors; and (2) substantive reasonableness, in which the court
will consider the length of the sentence imposed in light of the
statutory factors.8 2

80 Subsumed within this category of procedural errors is an incorrect Guidelines
calculation itself. See United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) ("An
error in determining the applicable Guidelines range.., would be the type of procedural
error that could render a sentence unreasonable under Booker."); cf. United States v.
Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e express no opinion as to whether an
incorrectly calculated Guidelines sentence could nonetheless be reasonable.").
81 Crosby, 397 F.3d. at 114-15. It is evident that the Crosby court's potential
"procedural" errors are principally intended to dismantle notions of "mandatoriness" in
sentencing procedure. This was the mandate of Booker/Fanfan and therefore on this
point Crosby breaks no new ground. But as an implementing decision, Crosby gives an
indication of how odd indeed sentencing law has now become. On the one hand, district
judges may still find facts, but they commit legal error if they use those facts to
mandatorily enhance the sentence beyond that justified by facts that were found in
conformity with Sixth Amendment requirements, i.e., found by a jury or admitted to by
the defendant. On the other hand, if they mandatorily impose a Guidelines sentence
based only on facts admitted to or found by a jury they will also be found to have imposed
an "unreasonable" sentence. The result is a regime in which sentencing judges should not
exercise their discretion in so constricted a manner as they once did, but yet they are
expected to follow certain standardized procedures (e.g., suggested Guidelines ranges, §
3553(a) factors) designed to foster the uniformity in sentences contemplated by the work
of the Sentencing Commission.
82 See id. at 113-15 (stating that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that
the sentencing judge must consider the Guidelines and all other factors listed in section
3553(a); identify the applicable Guideline ranges; and then decide the appropriate
sentence in light of these statutory factors).
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C. Disposition of Pre-Booker Sentences Pending on Direct Review
In addition to elucidating the legal principles that would apply
to appellate review of sentences after Booker, the court also
considered more mundane procedural issues such as what to do
with cases that were pending on direct review when Booker was
issued.
In reviewing sentences imposed after the Booker
decision, the Second Circuit would be guided by ordinary
prudential considerations such as the "plain error" test and the
"harmless error" doctrine.8 3 For pre-Booker sentences pending on
direct review in which a procedural error has occurred, the court
found that remand was appropriate, "not for the purpose of a
required resentencing, but only for the more limited purpose of
permitting the sentencing judge to determine whether to
resentence, now fully informed of the new sentencing regime, and
if so, to resentence." 84 As one pair of commentators has described
the approach, "if, on remand, a sentencing judge determines that
the sentence would essentially have been the same under the
post-Booker regime, any procedural errors in the original
sentencing resulting from a mistaken perception of the law will
be harmless and not prejudicial under a plain error analysis." 85
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RESOLUTION OF DISCRETE ISSUES
AFTER CROSBY

Since Booker was decided just under two years ago, the Second
Circuit has worked quickly in implementing the Supreme Court's
holding. While the following is not an exhaustive consideration
of all Booker issues that have come before the court, it examines
the key questions that have arisen thus far.
83 Id. at 116.
84 Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
85 Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Sentencing in the Post-'Booker' World, 231
N.Y.L.J. 3 (2005). This so-called "Crosby remand" presents potentially serious
implications for defendants. For example, with respect to those cases on direct review
when Booker was decided, the question arises whether the imposition of a lengthier
sentence on remand violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I of the Constitution.
Essentially, the argument is that such a result violates ex post facto principles because
the application of the Booker advisory regime on remand subjects a defendant to a
potentially greater sentence than he would have faced before Booker. Although the Second
Circuit in Crosby deferred ruling on this constitutional issue, Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117
n.17, it subsequently held that retroactive application of Booker's remedial holding to
cases on direct review did not constitute an ex post facto violation. See United States v.
Fairclough, 439 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2006), discussed in Part III.B infra.
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A. A Guidelines Sentence Is Not Presumptively Reasonable
Given the emphasis that Booker continued to place on the
Guidelines even under an advisory regime, and Crosby's firm
admonishment to district courts that the calculation of the
appropriate Guidelines range is still a vital step in arriving at a
sentence determination, the question becomes whether a
Guidelines range sentence is consequently entitled to special
deference on appellate review.
Several circuits have held that sentences within the applicable
Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable. 86 In establishing
a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, these circuits have
explained that such a holding is faithful to both the merits
analysis as well as the remedial portion of the Booker opinion.8 7
Once the presumption is established by a correctly determined
and imposed Guidelines range sentence, a defendant can rebut
the presumption by demonstrating its unreasonableness when
measured against the other § 3553(a) factors. 88 As the Seventh
Circuit has realistically observed, "[t]he Guidelines remain an

86 See, e.g., United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[I]f
determine under the appropriate standard of review that the district court correctly
determined the relevant Guidelines range, and if the defendant was subsequently
sentenced to a term of imprisonment within that range, then the sentence is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness on appeal"); United States v. Lewis, 436 F.3d
939, 946 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that "[a] sentence falling within the applicable guideline
range is presumptively reasonable"); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.
2006) (positing that "a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines
range... is presumptively reasonable" (quoting United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685,
687 (7th Cir. 2005))); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006)
("We ...credit[ I sentences properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness"); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.
2006) ("We agree with our sister circuits that have held that a sentence within a properly
calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable"); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415
F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaing that "the best way to express the new balance, in
our view, is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the
Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness").
87 See, e.g., Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 607 (stating that "while a per se or conclusively
presumed reasonableness test would undo the Supreme Court's merits analysis in Booker,
a clean slate that ignores the proper Guidelines range would be inconsistent with the
remedial opinion").
88 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). "Section 3553(a) remains in
effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will
guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is
unreasonable." Id.; cf. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608. The Seventh Circuit candidly
acknowledged, however, that "it will be a rare Guidelines sentence that is unreasonable."

Id.
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essential tool in creating a fair and uniform sentencing regime
89
across the country."
Adopting the position of a minority of circuits, 90 the Second
Circuit has not established a presumption that a Guidelines
sentence is reasonable. 9 1 Writing for the court in Fernandez,
Judge Jose A. Cabranes reiterated the court's reluctance to
formulate rules governing "reasonableness" review:
Although the Guidelines range should serve as 'a
benchmark or a point of reference or departure' for the
review of sentences, as well as for their imposition, we
examine the record as a whole to determine whether a
sentence is reasonable in a specific case. Accordingly, we
do not hold that a Guidelines sentence, without more, is
'presumptively reasonable.' 9 2
The Fernandez holding is no doubt designed to foster the kind
of flexible reasonableness review articulated in Crosby. The
Crosby court carefully noted that the creation of rules related to
"reasonableness" could "effectively re-institute mandatory
adherence to the Guidelines," 9 3 a result obviously foreclosed by
Booker.
However, in United States v. Rattoballi,9 4 an important recent
decision further explicating "the bounds of reasonableness
89 Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608.
90 See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc)
('"W do not find it helpful to talk about the guidelines as 'presumptively' controlling or a
guidelines sentence as 'per se reasonable,"' because, "[a]lthough making the guidelines
'presumptive' or 'per se reasonable' does not make them mandatory, it tends in that
direction; and anyway terms like 'presumptive' and 'per se' are more ambiguous labels
than they at first appear"); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006)
(declining to establish a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness because "[aippellants
already bear the burden of proving the unreasonableness of sentences on appeal"); United
States v. Carty, 453 F.3d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Athough several circuits have
afforded a presumption of reasonableness to within-the-Guidelines sentences, we have not
adopted this position") (internal citations omitted).
91 United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the Second
Circuit has a commitment to avoid the formulation of per se rules to govern the
reasonableness standards, and thus declining to establish a rebuttable presumption).
92 Id. at 28 (internal citations omitted). The circuit split on the presumption of
reasonableness may be resolved this term by the Supreme Court. On November 3, 2006,
the Court granted certiorari on this question in Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754, an
appeal from the Fourth Circuit, in which the Court will resolve, inter alia, whether the
presumption is consistent with Booker.
93 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
"reasonableness" is a concept of flexible meaning, and that the adoption of per se rules
would risk reinstituting mandatory adherence to the Guidelines).
94 452 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
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review," 9 5 the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a sentence
as substantively unreasonable, the first time the court has done
so since Booker.96 In the process, the court provided a significant
restatement of its sentencing law, particularly with respect to the
role of the Guidelines range in relation to the other § 3553(a)
factors.
i. Rattoballi's Renewed Emphasis on the Sentencing
Guidelines
Rattoballi vividly illustrates the conceptual difficulties that
arise as circuit courts attempt to administer an "advisory"
Guidelines system while also retaining "the considered judgment
of the Sentencing Commission as expressed in the Sentencing
Guidelines and authorized by Congress." 9 7 In other words, while
Booker may have consigned the Guidelines to the status of simply
one factor among others in § 3553(a), it seems reviewing courts
should still accord them substantial deference for the collective
sentencing wisdom they contain. As discussed in Part III.A,
supra, one means of doing this is by creating a presumption of
reasonableness for Guidelines range sentences.
In those
jurisdictions declining to adopt this presumption, such as the
Second Circuit, courts inevitably engage in the difficult task of
creating a coherent jurisprudence that respects the proper role of
the Guidelines in the sentencing process. After all, a decision not
to create per se rules or presumptions is intended to ensure that
the Guidelines do not receive the undue emphasis disallowed in
the post-Booker sentencing process. Yet if those same courts
adopt a deferential posture toward the Guidelines, they run the
risk of creating a de facto presumption of reasonableness anyway.
In strong language, Rattoballi reaffirms the Sentencing
Guidelines as an ordering principle in sentencing procedure.
Rattoballi was charged with conspiracy to rig bids in violation
of the Sherman Act and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. 98 He
pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government in
exchange for non-prosecution for any other crimes arising out of
the same conduct as well as the government's agreement to file a
95
96
97
98

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

128.
128-29.
133.
129.
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letter recommending leniency at sentencing because of his
cooperation with the government. 99 At sentencing, the
government urged a Guidelines range sentence of 27-33
months.1 0 0 The district court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence,
ordering Rattoballi to serve one year of home confinement, five
years' probation, and pay $155,000 in restitution.101 The district
court's oral explanation for its sentence rested on Rattoballi's
guilty plea, the effect the three-year investigation had on him
personally and his business, the potential failure of his business
were he to be imprisoned, and the need for him to work in order
to pay restitution for his crimes.10 2
The Second Circuit held that the "substantial deviation" from
the Guidelines range was unreasonable and that the district
court was statutorily obliged to include a written statement
detailing specifically why it had decided to deviate from the
recommended Guidelines range.l0 3 The real significance of
Rattoballi is found in its exposition of the law of "substantive
reasonableness," which considers whether the length of the
04
sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors.
With a deferential nod to the work of the Sentencing
Commission in creating the Guidelines and the Congress in
authorizing them, 105 the court broadly justified the Guidelines as
the embodiment of 'the collective determination of ... Congress,
the Judiciary, and the Sentencing Commission - as to the
appropriate punishments for a wide range of criminal
conduct."' 0 6 The court approvingly cites language from the First
Circuit that the Guidelines are not simply "another factor" to be
considered under § 3553(a), but rather an integration of the other

99 Id.
100 Id.at 130.
101 Id. at 131.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 128.
104 See id. at 131-32 (stating that second component of reasonableness review is
"substantive reasonableness," where court uses factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to
determine if length of sentence is reasonable); see also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d
103, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing duty that judges have in considering the factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
105 See Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133 (commenting that court will "seek guidance from
the considered judgment of the Sentencing Commission as expressed in the Sentencing
Guidelines and authorized by Congress").
106 Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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factors.10 7 After seemingly setting up this "first among equals"
status for the Guidelines in relation to the other statutory
factors, the court then articulates a series of principles governing
substantive reasonableness, all of which effectively create a
sliding-scale requiring greater justification by a district court the
more it deviates from the recommended Guidelines range.lOS
ii. A De Facto Presumption?
The court will "view as inherently suspect a non-Guidelines
sentence that rests primarily on factors that are not unique or
personal to a particular defendant, but instead reflect attributes
common to all defendants."10 9 Thus, in exercising their newfound discretion under Booker to impose non-Guidelines
sentences based on the particular circumstances of the
defendants before them, district courts' decisions will be
scrutinized to ensure that the departure was truly justified by
the uniqueness of the situation.1 1 0 In this regard, the court's
suspicion is clearly premised on its desire to promote genuine
uniformity in sentencing, an explicit aim of the Sentencing
Commission in creating the Guidelines.
In other words, a
discretionary or advisory sentencing regime does not require
courts to jettison their traditional concern for consistency in the
resulting sentences. 11 1
The court noted, but did not explicitly adopt, the practice in
other circuit courts to require district courts to "offer a more
compelling accounting the farther a sentence deviates from the
advisory Guidelines range."" 2 Yet the court emphasized that
"[its] own ability to uphold a sentence as reasonable will be
107 See id.(stating "[t]he guidelines cannot be called just 'another factor' in the
statutory list, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), because they are the only integration of the multiple
factors ..." (quoting United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006)
(italics in original))).
108 See id. at 133-34 (describing when and in what cases sentences will be declared
substantively unreasonable).
109 Id. at 133.
110 See id. at 134 (noting that "[a] non-Guidelines sentence... may be deemed
substantively unreasonable in the absence of persuasive explanation as to why the
sentence actually comports with the § 3553(a) factors").
111 The court further noted that its reasonableness review includes determining if a
non-Guidelines sentence was based on factors incompatible with the Sentencing
Commission's policy statements. Id. at 134. Such a finding renders the sentence
substantively unreasonable "in the absence of persuasive explanation as to why the
sentence actually comports with the 3553(a) factors." Id.
112 Id.
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informed by the district court's statement of reasons (or lack
thereof) for the sentence that it elects to impose."11 3 Despite its
refusal to explicitly endorse this practice, it may fairly be implied
from Rattoballi that the Second Circuit sees real merit in the
approach of its sister circuits.
Such a rule also promotes
uniformity in sentences and defers to the work of the Sentencing
Commission because it requires district courts to hew close to the
Guidelines, imposing non-Guidelines sentences only when
substantially justified. 114
The Second Circuit appears to reject the notion of "Booker
maximalism," under which district judges are purportedly vested
with great discretion to do justice in an individual case, with only
passing consideration of the Guidelines. 1 15 Writing for the court,
Chief Judge Walker indicated how closely tied a Guidelines range
sentence and a "reasonable" sentence are:
[A] district court may be able to justify a marginal
sentence by including a compelling statement of
reasons that reflect consideration of § 3553(a) and set
forth why it was desirable to deviate from the
Guidelines. In the absence of such a compelling
statement, we may be forced to vacate a marginal
sentence where the record is insufficient, on its own,
6
to support the sentence as reasonable.11
113 Id.
114 The Supreme Court recently heard argument in Claiborne v. United States, No.
06-5618, an appeal from the Eighth Circuit in which the Court will determine whether it
is consistent with Booker "to require that a sentence which constitutes a substantial
variance from the Guidelines be justified by extraordinary circumstances."
115 See McConnell, supra note 57, at 666 (describing "Booker maximalism" approach,
under which a district court can sentence a defendant according to the judge's sense of
justice, with merely passing consideration of the Guidelines.").
116 Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 135. Perhaps Rattoballi's apparent re-emphasis of the
Guidelines is less dramatic than it first appears. Judge McConnell notes that "there are
procedural and institutional considerations, built into the structure of sentencing, that
nudge district judges in the direction of Guidelines compliance." McConnell, supra note
57, at 682. For example, the Supreme Court in Booker instructs district courts to continue
calculating the Guidelines sentence as part of their § 3553 considerations. United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). Furthermore, the Second Circuit in Crosby reminded
district courts that the Guidelines range sentence remains a vital part of the sentencing
process. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). One year after Booker,
interestingly, sentences within the Guidelines range in the Second Circuit had fallen from
64% to 49%. See Alan Vinegrad & Douglas Bloom, "Booker" One Year Later, N.Y.L.J. Jan.
13, 2006, at 3. The "procedural and institutional considerations" that encourage
Guidelines compliance appear to have had less of an impact on district judges in the
Second Circuit. It will be interesting to see if Rattoballi has a demonstrable effect on the
percentage of Guidelines range sentences in the future.
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While it reiterates that a Guidelines sentence is not
presumptively reasonable in the Second Circuit, the onus
Rattoballi places on district courts to justify a non-Guidelines
sentence raises the question whether the court of appeals has
nevertheless created a de facto presumption.
With respect to a district court's need to justify its nonGuidelines sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), 11 7 Rattoballi
indicates what a judge must do to meet this obligation. The court
has emphasized that while a Guidelines sentence requires only
that the district judge state his reason in open court, a nonGuidelines sentence requires also a specific written statement of
reasons in the order of judgment and commitment.118 The nonGuidelines sentence justification need only be "a simple, factspecific statement explaining why the Guidelines range did not
account for a specific factor or factors under § 3553(a)."119
117 In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) provides:
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence (1) is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection (a)(4) [i.e., a
Guidelines sentence] and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for
imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range; or
(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsection (a)(4), the
specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described,
which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of
judgment and commitment ....
Id.

118 See Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 138 (discussing additional requirement of having
district court state reasons in written order for imposing sentence different from
Guidelines).
119 Id. On July 20, 2006, mere weeks after Rattoballi, Judge Rakoff in the Southern
District of New York issued a Sentence Memorandum explaining his reasons for not
imposing a Guidelines-range sentence. See United States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506
(2006). In justifying his sentencing of a white collar defendant to 42 months imprisonment
instead of the Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment, Judge Rakoff articulated the
shortcomings inherent in subjecting sentencing decisions to a systematic methodology.
For example, the Guidelines' "arithmetic approach" tends "to place great weight on
putatively measurable quantities, such as the weight of drugs in narcotics cases or the
amount of financial loss in fraud cases, without, however, explaining why it is appropriate
to accord such huge weight to such factors." Id. at 509. Judge Rakoff pointedly observed
that Adelson's case exposed "the utter travesty of justice that sometimes results from the
guidelines' fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm that guideline calculations
can visit on human beings if not cabined by common sense." Id. at 512. As a result, the
court chose instead to focus on the non-guidelines factors of § 3553(a). The court noted
that when a Guidelines-calculated sentence is "patently absurd" on its face, a greater
emphasis on the other § 3553(a) factors yields a sentence more appropriate to a
defendant's unique circumstances. Adelson suggests that the Guidelines apply
particularly incongruously in the white collar crime context. See Justin Bachman, Follow
the
Money
to
Prison,
BusinessWeek.com,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/nov2006/pi206l 11 -695231.htm?chan=se
arch (Nov. 2, 2006). White collar crime sentences "rise to a duration that makes many
legal experts question whether the justice system is shifting the role of deterrence into the
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Interestingly, the Second Circuit has expressly declined to
answer whether a district court's failure to abide by its § 3553(c)
obligations in imposing a non-Guidelines sentence provides an
"independent cause for remand."120
B. RetroactiveApplication of Booker Does Not Violate Ex Post
Facto Principles
22 the
In two related decisions, Vaughn121 and Fairclough,1
Second Circuit held that retroactive application of the advisory
sentencing regime does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution.12 3 Defendants who committed their crimes preBooker, but were sentenced post-Booker, argued that they were
unconstitutionally disadvantaged because "before Booker, [they]
were only exposed to sentences within the Guidelines range, and
after the Booker remedy, they [were] exposed to sentences within
an applicable statutory range." 12 4 In the defendants' view, the
new Booker sentencing regime clearly amounted to an
impermissible ex post facto law.
Guided by the Supreme Court's holding in Rogers v.
Tennessee,12 5 the Second Circuit reasoned that limitations on ex
post facto judicial decision-making are rooted in "core concepts of
notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning
as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching
criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent
conduct."12 6 The Second Circuit discerned no ex post facto
violation because the defendant "had fair warning that his
conduct was criminal, that enhancements or upward departures
could be applied to his sentence under the Guidelines based on

realm of overkill." Id.
120 Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 138-39 (declining to decide "whether remand is also
compelled by the district court's non-compliance with the written judgment requirements
of § 3553(c)(2)" because the sentence should be remanded for "unreasonableness").
121 United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005).
122 United States v. Fairclough, 439 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2006).
123 Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 521 (holding that "the retroactive application of the remedial
opinion in Booker, does not violate the ex post facto principle of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment); Fairclough, 439 F.3d at 79 (adopting Vaughn rationale in holding
district court did not violate ex post facto principle by retroactively applying Booker's
remedial holding).
124 Fairclough,439 F.3d at 78.
125 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
126 Fairclough,439 F.3d at 78.
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judicial fact-findings, and that he could be sentenced as high as
the statutory maximum." 12 7 Therefore, the companion cases of
Vaughn and Faircloughtogether reject ex post facto challenges to
both a district court's application of Booker to sentencing as well
as the circuit court's application of Booker to cases on direct
review. 128
C. Retroactive Application of Booker to Cases on Collateral
Review
While Booker explicitly applied its holdings to "all cases on
direct review," 12 9 it "made no explicit statement of retroactivity
to collateral cases." 13 0 The general rule is that new rules of
criminal procedure "should always be applied retroactively to
cases on direct review, but that generally they should not be
applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review." 13 1 A
new rule of constitutional law will be applied, however, if it is a
"substantive or a watershed rule of procedure that affects the
fundamental
fairness
and
accuracy
of the
criminal
proceeding." 132
Applying the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis, the
Second Circuit determined in Guzman that Booker does not apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. 13 3 In reaching this
holding, the court found that while Booker did announce a new
rule, it did not establish a "substantive" or "watershed" rule of
criminal procedure and therefore none of the exceptions to nonretroactivity should apply. 13 4 In the end, Booker does not alter
127 Id. at 79.
128 In concluding that Booker is properly applied to cases on direct review without
violation of ex post facto principles, the Second Circuit becomes the sixth federal court of
appeals to so hold. See United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005); United States
v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538 (7th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Dupas, 417 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 419 F.3d
916 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
129 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268.
130 Green v. United States, 397 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
131 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989).
132 Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 142-43. For example, Booker did not alter the substantive requirements for
particular crimes or render formerly proscribed conduct lawful. For an illustration see,
McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005), observing that "[n]o
conduct that was forbidden before Booker is permitted today; no maximum available
sentence has been reduced."
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the substantive law of crimes; it "change[s] the degree of
3
flexibility judges ... enjoy in applying the guideline system."1 5
In the court's view, Booker's alteration of the Guidelines system
to conform with Sixth Amendment requirements does not
amount to a "watershed" rule justifying its application on
collateral review. 13 6 The Second Circuit's holding in Guzman is
consistent with the majority of circuit courts to have considered
the issue. 13 7
D. Sentences May Be Based On Facts Not Alleged in the
Indictment
The Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line of cases makes clear that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."138 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, a
criminal defendant is entitled to have the facts supporting his
alleged criminality charged in a federal indictment.13 9 Extending
this principle to the Booker arena, a defendant argued to the
Second Circuit that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
that district courts may only sentence defendants based on facts
alleged in the indictment.140
Given the recent attention the Supreme Court has devoted to
ensuring that Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantees are strictly
observed, the challenge is a logical one. The Second Circuit
135 Guzman, 404 F.3d at 143 (citation omitted).
136 Id.
137 See Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2005); Lenford Never
Misses a Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2005); Lloyd v. United States,
407 F.3d 608, 610 (3d Cir. 2005); Cirilo-Munoz v. United States, 404 F.3d 527, 533 (1st
Cir. 2005); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 2005); Humphress v.
United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2005); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864,
868 (11th Cir. 2005); McReynolds, 397 F.3d at 481.
138 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
139 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (stating that "under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt").
140 United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 2006) (considering defendant's
argument that the "district court violated his constitutional rights by enhancing his
sentence on the basis of a fact ... not alleged in the indictment").
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examined the issue in United States v. Sheikh,141 a case in which
the defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and conspiracy to commit
securities fraud and mail fraud.142 The indictment charged
Sheikh with raising "approximately $538,000" in fraudulent
securities transactions, but it did not allege "a specific loss
amount attributable to [his] conduct."14 3 Sheikh was sentenced
under the advisory Guidelines regime and the district court
imposed a 14-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)
because the crimes resulted in a loss more than $400,000, but not
more than $1,000,000.144

The 46-month concurrent sentence

Sheikh received was below the statutory maximum for each
offense of conviction.145 Because Sheikh's sentence did not exceed
the statutory maximum, the express holding of Apprendi alone
enabled the court to resolve the case in summary fashion:
So long as the facts found by the district court do not
increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum
authorized by the verdict or trigger a mandatory
minimum sentence not authorized by the verdict that
simultaneously raises a corresponding maximum, the
district court does not violate a defendant's Fifth or
Sixth Amendment rights by imposing a sentence
based on facts not alleged in the indictment.146
The more difficult question, and one that the Second Circuit's
Sheikh holding implicitly resolved, is whether the omission from
a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory
maximum sentence results in a sentence violative of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.1 47 Apprendi and its progeny instruct
that such a scenario is constitutionally impermissible.
141 Id. at 905 (addressing defendant's challenge to the district court's calculation of
his sentence, based on facts that were not proved to a jury or admitted by him in his plea).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 906.
144 Id. ('The district judge adopted the government's Guidelines calculation...
stating that she 'believed that the guideline sentence is a reasonable sentence"').
145 Id. at 905.
146 Id. at 906.
147 The Supreme Court considered a related question in United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625 (2002). There, the issue before the Court was "whether the omission from a
federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justifies a
court of appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not
object in the trial court." Id. at 627. Defendants were found guilty of various crimes
related to cocaine distribution. However, the superseding indictment did not allege any of
the threshold levels of drug quantity that ultimately resulted in enhanced penalties at
sentencing. Id. at 627-28. After hearing testimony at trial, the district court made
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E. Co-Defendant DisparityNot a Basis for Non-Guidelines
Sentence
On appeal, defendants may argue that their lengthy sentences
should be reduced to conform to a co-defendant's more lenient
sentence. It is true that in determining an appropriate sentence,
the district court must consider, inter alia, "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 48 The
Second Circuit has noted, however, that Congress intended the
Guidelines to eliminate sentencing disparities on a national
1 49
level, not necessarily among co-defendants in the same case.
For example, under pre-Booker sentencing procedure, the court
declined to make mitigating role adjustments 50 based solely on a
given defendant's role in the criminal conduct vis-a-vis his co-

defendants. 151

findings of fact with respect to drug quantities and, consequently, defendants received
enhanced sentences. Id. at 628. Reviewing the proceedings in the lower court for plain
error, the Court upheld the sentence because the evidence of drug quantity found by the
district court was "overwhelming" and therefore the omission in the indictment did not
seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings in the district court. Id. at 633.
The decision in Cotton, however, is of limited relevance because it predated Booker and
therefore does not address the Sixth Amendment violations attendant upon having the
district court find facts that enhance the statutory maximum sentence.
148 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006).
149 United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing Congress'
objective in eliminating disparity on a national level); accord United States v. Joyner, 924
F.2d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1991) (commenting on elimination of nationwide disparity as
Congress' objective).
150 See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (2006) (providing for decreases in a defendant's offense level
based on the defendant's "minimal" or "minor" role in the offense).
151 For discussion of this issue see, United States v. Carpenter, 252 F.3d 230, 235 (2d
Cir. 2001), instructing that "[a] reduction [pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.2] will not be
available simply because the defendant played a lesser role than his co-conspirators; to be
eligible for a reduction, the defendant's conduct must be 'minor' or 'minimal' as compared
to the average participant in such a crime," quoting United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d
88, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Rather than simply compare the defendant's level of
involvement with his criminal cohorts, "the district court is required to gauge the
[defendant's] culpability relative to elements of the offense of conviction as well as in
relation to the co-conspirators." United States v. Neils, 156 F.3d 382, 383 (2d Cir. 1998)
(per curiam). The Second Circuit has explained the rationale for this rule: "if participation
in the offense were measured solely in relation to the co-defendants, the anomaly would
arise that a deeply involved participant would be rewarded with a downward adjustment,
just because his co-defendants were even more culpable." Id. at 383. In addition, such an
approach to downward adjustments undercuts the purpose of the Guidelines, which is to
impose similar sentences on similarly situated defendants regardless of their culpability
relative to other members of the criminal conspiracy. See Carpenter, 252 F.3d at 235
(citing United States v. Sentamu, 212 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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In United States v. Florez,15 2 the Second Circuit considered
whether § 3553(a)(6) permits district courts to consider
15 3
sentencing disparities between co-defendants in the same case.
Defendant Florez asserted that his 210-month sentence, 52
months less than the low end of his Guidelines range, was
unreasonable because of its disparity with his brother's 120month sentence. 154 The district court expressed doubt about the
leniency of the 120-month sentence,1 5 5 but nevertheless
"impos[ed] a non-Guidelines sentence [on Florez] that reduced
somewhat the disparity in the brothers' sentences." 156 Florez's
Booker argument on appeal was that the district court did not
adequately consider § 3553(a)(6) and therefore did not sentence
him with an objective of reducing the disparity between the two
sentences.157
The court rejected this argument, noting that "the requirement
that a sentencing judge consider an 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor is
not synonymous with a requirement [that] the factor be given
determinative or dispositive weight in the particular case."15 8
"[T]he weight to be given such disparities, like the weight to be
given any § 3553(a) factor, is a matter firmly committed to the
discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our [appellate]
review, as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable
in light of all the circumstances presented."159 Therefore, while
the Florez court did not disturb the district court's decision to
take into account co-defendant disparity as the basis for a nonGuidelines sentence, preferring instead to review the
152 447 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2006).
153 Id. at 157. One month prior to the Florez decision, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that "[tihe plain language of § 3553(a)(6) seems not to prohibit judges from
considering disparities between co-defendants." United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19,
32 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006). There the court identified the nub of the issue: "In light of the
[Sentencing Reform Act's] goal of national consistency in sentencing, there is
disagreement over whether § 3553(a)(6) may support a non-Guidelines sentence for the
purpose of preventing a disparity between sentences imposed on co-defendants." Id. at 32.
The Fernandez court, however, left resolution of the question "for another day." Id. Two
weeks after its decision in Florez, the Second Circuit again declined to resolve the issue.
See United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006).
154 Florez, 447 F.3d at 157.
155 Id. at 149 (explaining that Florez's brother pleaded guilty and was sentenced
before a different judge).
156 Id. at 158.
157 Id. at 157 (discussing Florez's challenge that the district court had committed a
procedural error in not fully considering § 3553 (a) (6)).
158 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added).
159 Id. at 158 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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reasonableness of the sentence under the totality of the
circumstances, it did not squarely decide whether co-defendant
disparity is even an appropriate consideration under § 3553(a)(6).
F. Safety-Valve Relief- Restitution - Supervised Release
Finally, the Second Circuit has resolved several miscellaneous
Booker challenges related to the issue of substantive sentencing
law and procedure, which are briefly summarized below.
i.Safety-Valve Relief
Federal law provides that a defendant may be sentenced to less
than the statutory minimum for an offense if he, inter alia, "has
truthfully provided to the government all information and
evidence the defendant has concerning the offense."1 60 Before
Booker, the burden fell on the defendant to prove to the court
that he had provided the necessary information warranting the
government's recommendation of a shorter sentence. 16 1 In
response to a Booker challenge that the burden of proof should
shift to the government to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant is ineligible for safety-valve relief, the
court has ruled that the defendant retains the burden to
demonstrate his eligibility for such relief.162
ii. Restitution
After conviction in the typical federal criminal trial, district
courts may order, as part of the sentence, "that the defendant
make restitution to any victim of [the] offense, or if the victim is
deceased, to the victim's estate." 1 63 In order to provide
appropriate restitution, the district court is authorized by statute
to order the probation officer "to obtain and include in its
presentence report... information sufficient for the court to
160 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (2006).
161 See United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) places burden on defendant to provide truthful
information to government in order to become eligible for reduced sentence and reasoning
that it logically follows that defendant must bear burden of proving to court that he has in
fact provided such information).
162 See United States v. Jimenez, 451 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding
precedent set in Gambino and stating that defendant continues to bear burden of proving
to court that he provided required information).
163 18 U.S.C. §3663(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order."16 4 Most
importantly for Booker purposes, this presentence report
contains "a complete accounting of the losses to each victim."1 65
Given Booker's statement that the Sixth Amendment "is
implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is
not solely based on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant," 16 6 the purported Sixth Amendment violation
becomes readily apparent. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has
held that orders requiring defendants to make restitution for loss
amounts not admitted in their plea allocutions or found by a jury
do not violate defendants' rights under the Sixth Amendment as
articulated in Booker.167 Perhaps most persuasively, the court
observed that Booker intended only to excise two provisions from
the Sentencing Reform Act and explicitly considered the
restitution provision to function validly and independently from
the problematic portions of the statute. 168

164 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2006).
165 Id.
166 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)).
167 See United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendants'
Sixth Amendment challenges to restitution orders supported by facts not found by jury or
admitted by defendants at trial and holding that restitution calculations made by judge in
such manner do not violate the Sixth Amendment as enunciated in Booker); accord
United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (concluding that
restitution "is not the type of criminal punishment that evokes Sixth Amendment
protection" and concluding "the amount a defendant must restore to his or her victim need
not be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt"); United
States v. Miller, 419 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating "the preponderance-ofevidence burden in restitution cases is unchanged by the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision" in Booker); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005)
(agreeing with "sister Circuits, who have uniformly held that judicial fact-finding
supporting restitution orders does not violate the Sixth Amendment"); United States v.
King, 414 F.3d 1329, 1331 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that "every circuit that
has addressed this issue directly has held that Blakely and Booker do not apply to
restitution orders" thus concluding that "the district court's error, if any, was not plain");
United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1051 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
restitution orders are unaffected by Blakely); United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134,
1144-45 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Apprendi and Blakely did not apply to
challenge restitution orders because amount did not exceed any statutory maximum);
United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that restitution
calculations are not affected by Apprendi).
168 Reifler, 446 F.3d at 116 (noting that the Booker Court considered most of statute
to be "perfectly valid" standing independently without the excised sections and
emphasizing that the Booker Court specifically considered restitution order provision to
be one of those retaining independent validity).
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iii. Supervised Release
In addition to imposing a term of imprisonment, district courts
are also authorized by statute to require that defendants be
placed on supervised release upon completion of their prison
terms. 169 If a defendant violates the conditions of his release, the
court may revoke supervised release "and require the defendant
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of
supervised release."170 In order to impose this penalty, the
district court is required only to "find[] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised
release."' 7 1 If the sentence for violation of conditions of release,
coupled with the original sentence served, exceeds the statutory
maximum for the initial underlying offense, must a jury under
Booker find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in
violation?
The Second Circuit holds that Booker does not affect sentences
for violations of supervised release. 1 72 Consequently, a defendant
does not have a right to have a jury to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt whether he violated his supervised release
when "the sentences imposed - (i) for the initial conviction and
(ii) for violation of supervised release - exceeded in the aggregate
the Guidelines range applicable at the initial conviction."17 3
The court has conceded, however, that "the supervised release
scheme is in some tension with the rationale of Blakely and
Booker."17 4 A serious argument can be made that under certain
circumstances a sentence imposed for violation of supervised
release appears to implicate Booker concerns. 175 Consider the
169 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2006) (granting court power to include as part of sentence a
term of supervised release after imprisonment).
170 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
171

Id.

172 United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 97-101 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding two-year
prison sentence imposed for violation of supervised release following a 30-month sentence
for conspiracy to assault a prisoner which fell outside of 5-11 month range recommended
by guidelines despite lack of jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt because these
considerations have always been discretionary and thus remain unaffected by Booker).
173 United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 2005).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 276-77 (noting that unlike parole considerations, sentences for violations of
supervised release can potentially exceed parameters of prison sentences for original
crime or conviction and "if a sentence for violation of supervised release were nothing but
a sentencing enhancement, beyond the punishment justified by the conviction, it could be
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facts in the McNeil176 case, for example. Defendant is sentenced
to 33 months for an offense that carries a statutory maximum of
41 months imprisonment.1 77 He serves the sentence, and is later
7
charged with violating the conditions of his supervised release.1 8
The district court then imposes a 15-month sentence on
revocation, which when added to the original 33-month sentence,
exceeds the statutory maximum for the underlying offense by 7
months.179 Without question, if "a sentence for violation of
supervised release were nothing but a sentencing enhancement,
beyond the punishment justified by the conviction, it could be
constitutionally infirm."SO Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has
declined to apply Booker to this circumstance, largely because
current law permits the imposition of a sentence upon revocation
that exceeds the time a defendant could have served based on his
original conviction. 181
IV. ASSESSING BOOKER AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
IMPLEMENTING JURISPRUDENCE

As one commentator has noted, the Booker decision itself is a
challenge to even comprehend.1 2 Perhaps one reason for this is
that the proposed remedy does not seem to correspond to the
perceived violation.1 3 The decision emerged from a recent shift
in the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that
called into question the decades-long practice of judicial factfinding to arrive at an appropriate sentence.1 S4 Yet the Court's
constitutionally infirm").
176 Id. at 275 (explaining facts behind defendant's prison sentence of 15 months for
violation of supervised release after serving 33 months for crime which corresponded to a
41 month maximum sentence under the guidelines).
177 Id. at 276.
178 Id. at 275.
179 Id. at 276.
180 Id. at 277.
181 Id.
182 Berman, supra note 6, at 345 (discussing the lack of brevity and clarity in the
Booker opinions).
183 See McConnell, supra note 57, at 677. "The most striking feature of the Booker
decision is that the remedy bears no logical relation to the constitutional violation." Id.
'The violation.., is that judges were permitted to make factual findings that properly
were the province of the jury." Id. "The remedy... was to give judges more power than
they had previously." Id.
184 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242 (1999) (questioning how the
Supreme Court precedent "recognizes a question under both the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury guarantee of the Sixth: when a jury
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solution was not to accord the jury a greater role in sentencing,
but rather to retain judicial fact-finding within an "advisory"
system. Professor Berman has captured the irony of Booker:
[T]he remarkable Booker decision found a way to
further obscure the Supreme Court's conceptually
muddled sentencing jurisprudence. Through the
amalgam of dual rulings from dueling majorities, the
Court declared in Booker that the federal sentencing
system could no longer rely upon mandated and
tightly directed judicial fact-finding. But, as a remedy,
the Court produced a system which now relies upon
discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding.
Thus, to culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking
to vindicate the role of the jury in modern sentencing
systems, Booker devised a remedy which ultimately
gave federal judges new and expanded sentencing

powers. 185
Judge McConnell and others contend, persuasively, that the
Booker opinions are lacking in consistency and coherence.1I 6 He
argues that the remedial opinion's flaws can be traced to the
"gaping doctrinal hole" in Booker's Sixth Amendment holding.1 8 7
The Stevens' majority acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment
is not violated by a fully discretionary sentencing scheme, i.e.,
one in which the judge is permitted to set a sentence anywhere
within the statutory range.188 For example, in sentencing a
defendant convicted of violating the federal felon-in-possession of
a firearm statute, the district court may impose imprisonment for
"not more than 10 years."18 9 In settling on the precise number of
determination has not been waived, may judicial factfinding by a preponderance support
the application of a provision that increases the potential severity of the penalty for a
variant of a given crime?"); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking "[tihat it is genuinely doubtful whether the
Constitution permits a judge.., to determine by a mere preponderance of the
evidence... a fact that increases the maximum penalty ... is clear enough from [the
Court's] prior cases ....
").
185 Berman, supra note 6, at 345 (emphasis added).
186 McConnell, supranote 57, at 677 (noticing the faults in the Booker holding).
187 Id. at 680 (postulating that "[b]ecause the Sixth Amendment majority reaffirmed
the constitutionality of discretionary judging, it left itself wide open to a remedial holding
that enhanced judicial discretion rather than eliminating judicial fact-finding").
188 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (positing that "when a trial
judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems
relevant").
189 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
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months or years the defendant should serve, the trial judge, not
the jury, finds facts relevant to this determination. This strikes
at the heart of the Sixth Amendment's core requirements;
namely, that the jury should find the facts supporting the
penalty.190 As Judge McConnell notes, the Booker Court does not
attempt to square its endorsement of discretionary sentencing
with its Sixth Amendment holding.19 1 In placing its imprimatur
on discretionary judging, the Supreme Court "left itself wide
open to a remedial holding that enhanced judicial discretion
rather than eliminating judicial factfinding." 92 Thus resulted
the remedial holding, devoid of much of its Sixth Amendment
bite: the Sixth Amendment is not offended by judicial factfinding,
so long as the Guidelines themselves are not mandatory in
application.
It also remains to be seen if Booker will remedy the oftcriticized complexity of the Sentencing Guidelines.1 9 3 It would
seem that Booker's apparent restoration of discretion to district
judges might reduce the traditional Guidelines emphasis on
mechanical precision in calculating sentences. Yet it may be that
the complexity inherent in the Guidelines system will be replaced
by a different sort of complexity.
Where few rules or
presumptions exist to guide the district courts' exercise of
discretion (as in the Second Circuit), sentencing law will take on
a patchwork quality, as the body of cases upheld as "reasonable"
increases. "[O]ver time, precedents governing the exercise of
Booker discretion will develop in a common law-like fashion, and
these precedents will constitute an increasingly intricate body of

190 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that in criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be tried by impartial jury); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 308-09 (2004) (stating that the Sixth Amendment is a reservation of jury
power).
191 McConnell, supra note 57, at 679 (commenting that "the Booker Court never
explained how such a system could be squared with its interpretation of the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment").
192 Id. at 680.
193 See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Future of Federal Sentencing:
Introduction, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 269, 270 n.7 (2006). "Deep dissatisfaction with the
Guidelines has been expressed from the moment they were adopted to the present." Id.
"The list of sins includes their being overly complex, overly rigid, placing too much
emphasis on quantifiable factors such as monetary loss and drug quantity." Id. Booker
may have done nothing to improve the sentencing and "appears to have only slightly
mitigated the rigidity and severity of the federal sentencing system, and it has perhaps
aggravated the system's overall complexity." See also Berman, supra note 6, at 349.
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law governing sentencing, which must be consulted in addition to
the body of law interpreting the Guidelines."194
The decisional law of the Second Circuit has been largely
faithful to the Supreme Court's Booker mandate. The Second
Circuit has done an admirable job of elucidating how sentencing
procedure functions in an "advisory" paradigm. Perhaps the
court has been too reluctant to craft rules or presumptions that
might aid in streamlining the sentencing process, but this is at
least consistent with Booker's attempt to restore some measure of
discretion to the district courts. Given the conceptual difficulties
inherent in Booker, the court has crafted a workable sentencing
procedure for the federal courts of New York, Connecticut, and
Vermont. It has answered a sizeable number of legal questions
that have arisen after Booker, sometimes following the majority
of its sister circuits, sometimes retaining a minority approach to
the issues, sometimes leading its sister circuits, as in its early
Crosby decision, thought by some to be "a template for the future
of sentencing."195 Particularly in light of the recent Rattoballi
decision, the future of sentencing in the Second Circuit will likely
further examine the role of the traditional Sentencing Guidelines
in the discretionary sentencing regime. It remains to be seen if
the current common law approach to sentencing will ultimately
serve the rule of law or further mire sentencing in inconsistency
and complexity. In practical effect, early statistical analyses
suggest that Booker has worked to the benefit of defendants in
the Second Circuit:
The Second Circuit, which exhibited higher-thanaverage levels of downward departures before Booker
and the nation's highest levels of downward
departures and variances after Booker, has been well
below the national norm in upward departures and
variances, both before and after the decision. This
194 McConnell, supra note 57, at 682. Other commentators, however, are hopeful that
a common law of sentencing will eventually give meaningful guidance on what constitutes
a "reasonable" sentence. For one example of such a view, see David J. D'Addio, Note,
Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate Review on Defendants'Rights, 24 YALE
L. & POL'f REV. 173 (2006), who notes that despite the conceptual difficulty with
determining what is "reasonable" in the abstract, "[olver time, case by case, appellate
courts will make clear what constitutes a reasonable sentence; perhaps the elusive
common law of sentencing will finally bloom." Id. at 194 n.97.
195 Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The
Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 9 (2005).
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suggests that discretion in the Second Circuit is
principally exercised in favor of the defendant. 196
Perhaps this is not a useful way to gauge the success or failure
of the advisory Guidelines system. In the end, sentencing should
be directed at doing justice in individual cases according to law,
without undue emphasis on the resulting statistics. In striving
to uphold the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment in dispensing
criminal justice, the federal courts of appeals are serving a vital
role as they assist in the development of sentencing law.

196 McConnell, supra note 57, 675-76.

